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Comment and Reply

PRICE BEHAVIOR IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPSONY:

WASHINGTON PROCESSING POTATOES -A COMMENT
NATHALIE LAVOIE

In a recent article in this journal, Richards,
the CV should not be interpreted in the same
way in a theoretical versus empirical context.
whether the Washington State frozen potato
processors behave as an oligopsony and de-firm
In theory,
represents
the
"conjecture"
of
dxj?x how
i regarding
firm j will
react
to an in-

Patterson, and Acharya (RPA) evaluate

termine the welfare loss associated with this

crease in quantity by firm i. Empirically, while
market structure. For this purpose, the authors

early work gave a behavioral interpretation
use the Green and Porter trigger price model
to the estimated value of Oi or "conduct pa-

of collusion. However, this article contains errameter," recent practice has been to interpret

rors in the derivation of the industry averthe conduct parameter as an index of market
age conduct parameter and in the derivation
power that ignores the (unknown) game that
and calculation of the loss in producer welfirms play (Perloff).2'3 Finally, Corts demonfare. These errors make the article confusing
strated that Bresnahan's middle ground inand have important implications for the inter-

terpretation of the conduct parameter-firms'
pretation of the results and associated policy
behavior is as competitive as if they held the
recommendations.
conjecture implied by the estimated value-is
The first mistake occurs in the derivation of

valid only under a restrictive condition.4 Nev-

the values of the industry average conjecturalertheless, validations of the conduct parameter
variation (CV) elasticity under different forms
approach using direct measures of marginal
of firm conduct. CV is defined as
cost to compute the "true" value of the conduct parameter have shown that the method
dX

(1) i dX= 1 + vi

performs reasonably well for low levels of mar-

dxi

ket power (Genesove and Mullin; Clay and

where X is the industry output, xi is firm i's

output, v, = N L', and xj = firm j's output.
CVs have been the subject of both criticism
and confusion in their interpretation.' First,
the nomenclature "conjectural variation" in itself is confusing because it has been used in the

literature and textbooks to describe either Oi,

Troesken).
RPA model the profit-maximization problem of a typical potato processor in an industry characterized by oligopsony power. In
this market structure, the notion of CV comes

into play because firms are mutually interdependent in their actions. While the model is

dx,

vi (Waterson; Jacquemin), or even 2(Kamien
and Schwartz; Brander and Zhang). Second, as
emphasized by both Bresnahan, and Perloff,

2 The terminology "conduct parameter" has been used generically in the literature to describe the estimated value of either the
CV (0,) or the CV elasticity (X M-L). I will use the term "conduct

parameter" generically also.

3 By expressing 0, in elasticity form, its interpretation as a mea-

Nathalie Lavoie is assistant professor in the Department of Resource Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
The author thanks Mingxia Zhang for verifying the derivation of

equation (4). The author also gratefully acknowledges the helpful
comments and suggestions of two anonymous reviewers and editor
Ian Sheldon. Thanks also go to Tim Richards for his cooperation
by providing the data used and the estimate of the beta parameter.
However, all errors are the author's responsibility.
1 See Carlton and Perloff; Kamien and Schwartz; Bresnahan;
Jacquemin; Perloff; and Corts for the discussion of this topic.

sure of departure from competition becomes clear. The Lerner
index in this case corresponds to the CV elasticity divided by the
elasticity of demand. Thus, the CV elasticity can be interpreted
as an elasticity-adjusted Lerner index and provides a measure of
market structure or departure from perfect competition (Perloff;
Corts; Wolfram).
4 Corts demonstrates that the estimated CV parameter measures
the marginal, not average, collusiveness of conduct. Thus, market
conduct inference is limited to cases where behavior in equilibrium
is identical on the margin, not on average, to a CV game.
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specified for a typical firm, only
industry
Table 1. Values
of dx , 0, and Ondata
for Identical
are available-a common difficulty
this
type
Firms in
under
Different
Forms of Firm Conduct
of analysis. When only industry data are available, Bresnahan argues that the aggregate con-

duct parameter should be interpreted
as the
Firm Conduct
0a
dx, dx
industry average conduct. It is in aggregating
Perfect collusion 1 N 1

the firms' supply relation to obtain an industry

competition
0 1
average that an error occurs. Cournot
This error
leads
Bertrand/perfect
competition
O0 0
N-1
to a misspecification of the benchmark
values
of the industry average CV elasticity against
which the estimated parameters are compared

to assess the degree of departure from competition and the associated welfare loss. Thus, the
pretation of the conduct parameter to an "a
interpretation of the results isgregate
affected
by this
conduct
parameter" (Corts, p. 231).

mistake.

In fact, the aggregate conduct parameter

When firms are not identical (the more gen- (0a) can be interpreted as the industry aver
eral case), aggregating involves weighting each
age CV elasticity. The CV elasticity (dX x
firm's supply relation by its market share and
takes the form of 0/N when firms are identic
summing across firms (Porter 1983a; Goldberg

and Knetter; Wolfram).5 When there are N (and Oi = 0 for all i) because each firm has

identical firms, the market share of each firm market share equal to 1/N. Table 1 summarizes

is 1/N and aggregating is done by summing

the values taken by 3L, 0, and Oa under differ
the supply relations over all firms and dividingent forms of firm conduct. In a Cournot settin
by N (Perloff; Corts). RPA assume N identi-with identical firms, Oa takes the value of 1/N
cal firms with the same marginal cost (cq), the because each firm believes its rivals' quantity i
same technology (X, the conversion rate of rawfixed, i.e., dx = 0 and 0 = 1. As shown in the t

potatoes to french fries), behaving according
ble, 0a ranges between 0 (perfect competitio
to the same CV (0 defined as in (1)), and fac-and 1 (perfect collusion) and not between 0
ing the market supply curve w(X, z), where zand 2 as claimed by RPA.6 The CV elasticit
is a vector of exogenous supply-shift variables.
always ranges between 0 and 1.7
RPA then aggregate the first-order condition It is important to correctly specify the value

over N firms to obtain the intermediate step: taken by the CV elasticity under the forms of
conduct listed in table 1 because those values
N
can be used as benchmarks to determine the

N(p - cq)h - Nw(X, z) - lO i xi = 0

extent of market power in the industry. For
example, when there are five identical firms
buying an homogeneous product, an estimated
where-q = and j=1 xi = X. Divide by
Nof Oa greater than 0.2 but less than 1
value
and rearrange to obtain a similar equation to
i=1

equation (RPA5):

pX-w(X, z) = CqkX + 0aX.

would imply that the level of market power is

greater than that implied by Cournot competition but less than under a joint monopsony

6 RPA cite Brander and Zhang for the bounds of the industry
This equation, however, differs from RPA

average CV between 0 and 2. However, Brander and Zhang model

in that Oa = = (1 + i dx) whereas
an airline duopoly where they actually estimate each firm's conjecN j dx,the authors to
0RPA - = 1 + k i l,N1leading
incorrectly specify the range of this conduct
parameter. The above definition of 0a, when
firms are identical and 0i = 0 for all i, is in
agreement with the literature, e.g., Waterson;
Perloff; Corts; and also Wolfram. The aggregation of the supply relationship from the firm
level to an industry level changes only the inter-

ture (v,). CV (0 as defined in (1)) does vary between 0 and 2 for a
duopoly, but not the CV elasticity.
7 More generally, when firms are not identical and do not have

the same conjectures, 0a = ,N s,20, where s, is the market share
of firm i, 0, is as defined in (1), and s,O, is the general form of
the CV elasticity (Porter 1983a; Goldberg and Knetter; Wolfram).
Thus, 0a can be interpreted as the industry weighted average CV
1,
under Bertrand/perfect
competition,
Cournot
competition,
and
elasticity.
It takes the
values of
0, ENI_
st2(Herfindahl
perfect collusion, respectively. It can be seen that 0a=0/N is a special case of the general model and results from the assumptions
of identical firms with identical conjectures. In this special case,
the industry average CV elasticity (08) is the same as each firm's

CV elasticity. See also Muth and Wohlgenant for the derivation
5 Note that Porter (1983a) uses 0i to represent the firm's and
CVinterpretation of the aggregate conduct parameter under two
elasticity rather the CV defined in equation (1).
special cases.

index), and
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or perfect cartel.
Porter
(1983a);
than predicted
by the noncollusive
Cournot
scenario where
0a = 0.2 when
N = 5, the num- G
and Zhang; Deodhar
and
Sheldon;
ber of major players
in the industry and
according C
and Mullin; Wolfram;
Sexton;
to RPA, and it in fact of
represents
behavior close
Troesken are examples
articles

ing

or

against

testing

estimated
par
to a joint monopsony.9conduct
While 0a > 1, under the
collusive
regime, is not a problem or
in itself
betheoretical
benchmarks
givi

cause the estimate
is probably
not statistically
an "equivalent number
of
symmetric
different from (i.e.,
one, Porter N
(1983b)
"in
firms" interpretation
=shows
1/0a

that

the

trigger
price
model
of
general
the optimal quantity
in cooperative
pe- G

Porter and the one of RPA assume reversion to

riods will exceed that which would maximize

a single-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium durexpected oint net returns in any single period"
ing punishment periods, it is imperative to(p. 314).1 This logic would imply that the concompare the estimated level of market power
duct parameter would normally be strictly less
than 1, even in collusive regimes.
under reversionary periods with this theoretical benchmark to evaluate the consistency It is a source of concern that such high deof the results with the conceptual model.8 grees of collusion are estimated under both
From now on, I use the notation 0a definedregimes and, consequently, the results do not
above.
conform well to the trigger price strategy of
RPA (personal communication) indicate
collusion put forth by the authors. However,
that Oa was not restricted in their estimation to
if one believes the estimated conduct paramlie within any conceptual bounds. Thus, while eters, then the estimated degree of departure
the empirical estimates of 0a are not affected from competition indicates the presence of a
by this conceptual error, there are important powerful cartel and would likely warrant an
implications for the interpretation of these es- antitrust investigation.
The mistake in the definition of the benchtimates of market power.
The authors estimate the conduct parame- mark values of the industry average CV elasticters in the collusion regime to be 1.038 and ity also has important implications for the in0.861 in the punishment regime. Note that terpretation of the magnitude of welfare loss in
under the authors' derivation of the indusRPA's table 2.11 Given the extent of departure
from competition implied by RPA's results, it is
try average CV elasticity, 0RPA = 1.038 would
surprising that their estimate of producers' loss
be roughly equivalent to Cournot competition in the collusive regime. In contrast, their
due to imperfect competition ($0.369 million/

economic model, following Green and Porter,
month) represents only 1.6% of the aver-

age shipment value during the sample peassumes that firms revert to Cournot competition in the punishment regime. Under the corriod (when the supply flexibility (p) is 2.16).
rect interpretation of the industry averageThis
CV percentage loss in producer surplus (PS)
elasticity, 0a, the estimates of the conduct is
pa-small relative to the theoretical prediction
that can be derived. In deriving the theoretirameter under both the collusive and punishment regime mean a much higher degree
cal of
predictions, I have also found a mistake in
market power than implied by Cournot comequation (RPA18). In what follows, I rederive
(RPA18)
to develop theoretical predictions for
petition. Specifically, in collusive periods,
Oa
= 1.038 m 1.0 indicates that potato processors
the percentage loss in PS due to oligopsonistic
perfectly collude to maximize their joint profit.
power of potato processors.
Even in the punishment regime (0a = 0.861),
the departure from competition is much larger

9 It should also be noted that those estimates of CV elasticity
are also large in the context of previous empirical research. Sexton
and Lavoie's survey of the literature indicates that the measured
8 In collusive periods, the theory provides an expected range for
the estimated value of the conduct parameter, i.e., greater thandepartures from competition in the food processing industry have
mostly been small with CV elasticities often below 0.2. This rethe value expected under the punishment period, but smaller than
sult is true even in highly concentrated industries such as the meat
the value expected under static joint profit maximization (Porter
1983a, Porter 1983b). In punishment periods, the theory provides
processing industry where Azzam and Pagoulatos estimated the
buyers' CV elasticity to be 0.223. See also table 1 of Sheldon and
a specific expected value for the conduct parameter, i.e., the value
Sperling,
which summarizes market power and Lerner index estiof the CV elasticity under the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium when
mates in the food and related industries.
price is the strategic variable, or the value of the CV elasticity under the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when quantity is the strategic10 Intuitively, colluding at a quantity higher than the monopsony
variable. Price is the strategic variable in Porter's (1983a) model,quantity reduces the incentives to cheat on the agreement. The
gains to cheating decrease as the colluding quantity increases for
and he explicitly compares the estimated value of the conduct parameter under cooperation with both the Cournot benchmark and
a given trigger price and length of punishment period.
the expected range of this parameter to evaluate the consistency"1 Note that with 0a e [0;1], the last three columns of RPA's table 2
are not relevant.
of the results with the conceptual model.
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The expression for the marginal

(MO) curve is12

x

(2) MO = (1 - a) [?XP + Oa (p +

S IF

Ot) .

Note that this specification also imp

Oa ranges between 0 (perfect com
and 1 (monopsony), because Oa can b

+

preted as a weight between the industr

curve and marginal cost curve in det
the quantity purchased (Melnick and
Sexton and Lavoie). Moreover, two te
missing in (RPA17), the equation tha
the difference in PS between compet
oligopsonistic outcomes. It should re

" a"
0)

1

1

0?

(3)
p+1I

Wc Wc P
Oap + 1 p(Oap + 1

cO

wc

(p + 1)(Oap + 1)

W 1)
X P(0a-p + 1) "
II

E

Thus, the expected loss in PS when there are
shifts in behavioral regime corresponds to

. - x Ix

( s P we P

.0 +

O

(4) PSdiff =p 1 -) T -T

00

ri
LE
a-

1P +1

0

agl,
a-

1

p1+1

0
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E

a

k

oo
.U:

0

o

E

,--00

0

oo a

andFour
differs
from analytical
(RPA18) by
the factor
alternative
expressions
forP.13
the relative loss of producer welfare due to

imperfect competition can be derived by divid-

ing the expression for absolute producer loss
in equation (3) by the expressions for (a) the

ei3
Cu
oH

o

c

z

e4
a

.t
0._

0

12 This expression simplifies to MO = PXP + Oap PXP, where 3
is a constant in the equation for inverse supply, and p replaces -q
in RPA-a typo. To avoid confusion, readers should also note the
typo in the definition of p on p. 266. As in Huang and Sexton, p
represents a supply flexibility and should be defined as q , not 1.
3 The omission of the factor P in (RPA18) cannot by itself explain low measures of welfare loss. If RPA omitted the factor P
in their calculation of producers' welfare loss, the correct numbers
in table 2 of RPA would be lower, thus only reinforcing my observation that the welfare losses are small compared to the theoretical
predictions.
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In the
summary,
RPA
competitive PS, (b)
oligopsonist
rametersrevenue,
within aa
the competitive producer
price framework
o
oligopsonistic producer
revenue. The
the level
of marke
ical expressions appear
in the
first r
ton State
potato
proc
ble 2. All expressions
are a
function
benchmark
valu
0a. Thus, they canthe
be evaluated
at the
parameter
a
value of p (2.16) conduct
and under
a collusi
their
results.
Specif
1.038) and a punishment (0a = 0.861
timated
values
of
t
Regardless of the
measure
used,
th
loss in PS is much
larger
than
1.6%
ply
a much
larger
d
the
potato that
processin
culated by RPA. I
presume
the
revenue used by by
RPA
("the
RPA.
In average
fact, th
der
collusive period
value of producer
shipments")
repre
oligopsonistic producer
revenue.
How
imize their
joint
pr
as a monopsony.
Ev
theoretical prediction
suggests that
centage loss in PS
should
be
betw
regime,
the
conduc
and 314% relative
to with
the oligopsoni
sion
0a = 0.861
parture
from
comp
ducer revenue, or
at least
$58.66
m
welfare
losses for
month. The predictions
presented
in p
t
also consistent with
those
of Sexton
w
what
would
be attai
tition.based
I also show that the
relative
measure of
using simulations
on
linear
de
loss calculated
RPA is significantly
supply equations, welfare
that
the by
loss
in PS r
an

important

lower than the theoretical
this
percentage
ofpredictions
the for
compe

level of departure from competition.
even at modest departures
from com
Thus, if the reader accepts the
estimated valNote that the theoretical
predictio
ues of the conduct
parameters, theof
resultsp
of an
pend on the estimated
values
RPA suggest
significant producer welfare
loss
the functional form
assumption
for
t
of processing potatoes.
However,
due to the presence of
a monopsony-like cartel th
in the potato processingalso
industry. Given
such
welfare loss calculations
depend
value of P, the value
of behavior
the and
proxy
for
anticompetitive
associated loss
producer welfare, an antitrustpotatoes
investigation
petitive price ofin processing
would seem to be warranted.
However, some
the reference measure
of producers
may not readily
this conclusion
The value of the readers
proxy
is accept
especially
without aof
clearer welfare
explanation of the apparent
for the calculation
losse
inconsistencies
notedwc
here between
the empirically, lower values
of
than
tha
ical results and
the underlying theory.lower
In this
by the model would
generate
case, furtherloss
research should
reinvestigate
the
and relative welfare
than
that
p
by

theory.

14

degree of imperfect competition in the Washington processing potato industry.

14 I find that the value of w, implied by the model is much higher

than the value of the proxy used by RPA. RPA proxy the com[Received October 2003;
petitive price of processing potatoes (w,) by scaling downward
accepted May 2004.]
the fresh market potato price series by 23% to take into account
a conversion ratio of raw to processed potato of 0.5. The average monthly price of fresh potatoes is $4.75/cwt (according to the
data provided by RPA), thus the average monthly value of w, is
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